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"JUDICIAL TERRORISM"?
ANALYSIS OF THE EXXON/VENEZUELA
LITIGATION AND PREJUDGMENT




In the 1990s, Venezuela began encouraging foreign oil
companies to invest in its oil-rich Orinoco region.' To attract
investment, Venezuela offered incentives to foreign companies,
including Exxon Mobil (Exxon), ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Total, BP,
2and Statoil. Among the incentives were attractive tax rates; minority
shares in Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA); and contracts providing for arbitration of
disputes in New York.3 After the election of Hugo Chavez as president
in 1998, Venezuela sought to change the terms of its bargain with the
foreign oil companies. 4 A series of newly enacted laws, including tax
and royalty hikes, reversed the financial incentives that had initially
attracted foreign investment.
This trend culminated in the Venezuelan Government's 2006
demand that its state-owned company, PDVSA, assume majority
control over all Orinoco projects.6  Instead of complying with
Venezuela's demands, Exxon decided to walk away from its
investments in the Orinoco and negotiate compensation from the
Venezuelan Government.7 Disputes over the value of Exxon's assets
caused the company to file a request for arbitration with the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in
September 2007.8 After filing this request, Exxon obtained court
1 Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing






7 Witten, supra note 1, at 58.
'Id. at 59.
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orders in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Netherlands
Antilles freezing approximately $12 billion of PDVSA's assets.
9
Furthermore, Exxon obtained a court order from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York attaching "$300
million in cash belonging to the Exxon/PDVSA joint venture." 10
Although Exxon appeared to have a strong claim under its
contract with Venezuela, the freezing of a foreign country's assets has
unavoidable political implications. Venezuela's oil minister, Rafael
Ramirez, responded to Exxon's legal action by exclaiming that Exxon
"aims to subject [Venezuela] to a situation ofjudicial terrorism, of legal
terrorism."'1  The oil minister accused the American company of
attempting to "destabilize the government of anti-U.S. President Hugo
Chavez by using the legal battle over the nationalization of an Exxon
project to create panic about the . . . nation's finances.' 2  While
Venezuela might not be a sympathetic party, the Venezuelan minister's
strong reaction to the prejudgment attachment of assets is not surprising
and reflects the sensitive issues that arise when one nation's courts
exercise control over the assets of another nation.
In the United States, the law governing a court's ability to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and their assets is the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).I3 This article will examine
the extent to which the FSIA accords due weight to interests of
sovereignty-strongly expressed by Mr. Ramirez-while reconciling
those interests with the reasonable expectations of modem international
business. Venezuela, as a general rule, should enjoy its sovereignty as
do other nations. A contracting party such as Exxon, however, also
deserves to enjoy the benefit of its bargain. Indeed, recognizing and
honoring the binding nature of Venezuela's agreements would also
serve its own long-term interests.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the history and
purpose of the FSIA. It specifically focuses on prejudgment attachment
9 Id.; see also Brian Ellsworth, Venezuela Slams Exxon Over Asset Freeze,
GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 9, 2008, at B6 (quoting the amount of assets frozen).
10 Witten, supra note 1, at 59; see also Order Confirming Attachment,
Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. PDVSA Cerro Negro S.A., No. 07 Civ. 11590
(DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008).
11 Ellsworth, supra note 9, at B6.
12 id.
'3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1441,
1602-1611 (2006).
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of assets and which parties' courts should properly consider "foreign
states" or "instrumentalities of a foreign state" under the Act.
Part III analyzes two articles criticizing the FSIA and reviews
their respective proposals for reforming the statute.
Finally, Part IV makes three suggestions for improving the Act.
First, Congress should expand the definition of "foreign state" to
include a broader range of state-managed corporations. 4 Second, this
expansion in scope should be counterbalanced by relaxing the
protections afforded to "foreign states." Thus, the United States should
remove the waiver requirement for the prejudgment attachment of
assets.' 5 Not only does this change amount merely to the alteration of
one default contractual term, but it also more properly represents the
expectations of the parties. Third, the Act should explicitly include a
legal standard to be applied in prejudgment attachment cases.
Though important, these three changes would not affect the
outcome of the Exxon/Venezuela litigation. They would, however,
better accomplish the purposes of the FSIA. These changes strike the
proper balance between the respect owed to foreign nations and the
legitimate expectations of private parties contracting with foreign states
in business relationships.
11. BACKGROUND OF THE FSIA
Subpart II(A) provides a brief history of the FSIA and the
reasons for its enactment. Subpart II(B) then provides a brief overview
of how the statute currently operates. Finally, subpart II(C) explains
the method for obtaining prejudgment attachment under the FSIA by
reviewing the relevant sections of the Act and analyzing case law.
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE FSIA
Sovereign immunity has long been a staple of American
jurisprudence. "Historically, sovereigns and their property enjoyed
absolute immunity from suit, attachment, and execution in most
countries, absent their consent. In the United States, this 'absolute
theory' of immunity was established in Schooner Exchange v.
"4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
1 See id. § 1610(d).
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Mcfadden .... Schooner Exchange, an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1812, held that a foreign public ship is immune
from attachment in the ports of a friendly state.' 7 A contrary ruling, he
determined, "(in the absence of consent by the affected state) would
impugn the dignity of foreign sovereigns and discourage 'mutual
intercourse' and 'interchange of good offices' among States.
1 8
The policy of absolute immunity continued into the twentieth
century but became increasingly problematic as private parties
contracted with foreign states in commercial enterprises and were left
without recourse when disputes arose. 19  This situation led to the
issuance of the "Tate Letter" in 1952.20 Issued by a State Department
legal advisor, "[t]he Tate Letter asserted that sovereigns should enjoy
immunity for sovereign or public acts (jure imperii), but not for
commercial or private ones (juri gestionis).21 U.S. courts followed
this approach, "but only with respect to immunity from suit; they
continued to afford sovereigns absolute immunity from attachment and
execution, absent their consent."22 The FSIA, enacted by Congress in
1976, established for the first time "certain limitations on sovereign
immunity from attachment and execution., 23 Some slight amendments
have been made to the statute since its creation, such as the terrorist
state provision, but the basic framework of the statute has remained
largely unchanged.24
A basic notion of fairness is the policy rationale behind the FSIA.
In an age where citizens and sovereigns often engage in contractual
business relationships, absolutely denying citizens recourse for the
wrongs of foreign states is unfair.25 However, the Act recognizes the
special position of foreign sovereigns by allowing suits to proceed only
16 George K. Foster, Collecting From Sovereigns: The Current Legal
Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States
and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 665, 717 (2008).
17 Schooner Exch. v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).




21 Id. at 718.
22 Id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486
(1983)).
23 Id.
24 Foster, supra note 16, at 718. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(7).
25 Foster, supra note 16, at 718.
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on the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule of immunity.
26
Congress designed the limited exceptions to avoid or minimize the
problems that can arise from suits against foreign sovereigns. Such
suits "have the potential to interfere with ... governmental functions,
unsettle diplomatic relations, and trigger retaliatory seizures.,
27
Indeed, the words of Venezuela's oil minister, Raphael Ramirez,
illustrate how real these problems can be.28
B. OPERATION OF THE FSIA
"The FSIA is the mechanism for gaining jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign, its officials and agents, its political subdivisions and
government offices, and its agencies and instrumentalities. 29 Indeed,
it is the sole mechanism for gaining "jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign entity in a United States court (whether federal or state)."
30
Thus, attachment of foreign state assets is exclusively a question of
federal law.
The threshold question in any FSIA case is whether a given
entity is a "foreign state" under the statue. This question has given the
courts considerable difficulty.3' 28 U.S.C. §1603 provides the
definition of "foreign state":
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate
or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose
26 id.
27 Id.
28 See Ellsworth, supra note 9, at B6.
29 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 199 (2d ed.
2006).3 0 Id. at 200.
31 See Working Group of the American Bar Association, Report:
Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
489, 493 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Report].
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shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the
United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of
this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
3 2
The defendant, or purported foreign sovereign entity, bears the
burden of proving it is a "foreign state." 33 This threshold determination
is important because "[t]he FSIA provides that, subject to certain
exceptions, foreign states are immune from suit in U.S. courts." 34 The
plaintiff in foreign sovereign immunity cases bears the burden of
showing that one of the exceptions applies. Absent such a showing, the
defendant is immune from suit because U.S. courts cannot claim
jurisdiction.3 5 The general exceptions to immunity are laid out in
section 1605 of the statute. "In rough order of importance they are: the
commercial activity exception (section 1605(a)(2)), waivers of
immunity (section 1605(a)(1)), tortious acts (section 1605(a)(5)), and
the newly-legislated terrorist States exception (section 1605(a)(7)).,
3 6
The commercial activity exception reads:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States[.]
37
32 28 U.S.C. § 1603. This article will pay particular attention to §
1603(b)(2), which defines how the courts determine whether a given
corporation is an "instrumentality of a foreign state."
33 BEDERMAN, supra note 29, at 200.
34 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 500; see 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
35 BEDERMAN, supra note 29, at 200.
36 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
3' 28 U.S.C. § 1605. "Commercial activity," and "commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state" are both defined in the
definitional section of the statute, § 1603. "A 'commercial activity' means
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Thus, in any foreign sovereign immunity case, a defendant must
first prove its status as a "foreign state." If a defendant is able to prove
its status as a "foreign state," then it is presumptively immune from
suit. A plaintiff then bears the burden of showing that one of the
exceptions to immunity applies to the defendant. Only upon a
successful showing by the plaintiff may a court claim jurisdiction over
the defendant.
C. PREJUDGMENT A TTA CHMENT IN THE FSIA
Once a court establishes jurisdiction over a defendant state, it may
then determine whether it can properly attach the state's assets before a
judgment has been entered. Generally, subject to treaties and
agreements to which the U.S. is a party, the property of a foreign state
located in the U.S. is immune from attachment.3s The FSIA, however,
authorizes prejudgment attachment under one narrow exception.
Subsection 1610(d) explains when a court may attach a foreign state's
assets prior to judgment:
(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in
section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial
activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any
action brought in a court of the United States or of a
State, or prior to the elapse of the period of time
provided in subsection (c) of this section, if-
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity from attachment prior to judgment,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. § 1603(d). "A 'commercial
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state' means a commercial
activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the United
States." Id. § 1603(e).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1609. The section reads: "Subject to existing international
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this
Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from
attachment, arrest, and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611
of this chapter." Id.
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foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure
satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may
ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and
not to obtain jurisdiction.39
"The grounds for obtaining a pre-judgment attachment are . . .
more limited than those for executing a judgment or attaching in aid of
execution., 40 Prejudgment attachment "requires an unequivocal waiver
. . . . In contrast, with respect to the waiver of post-judgment
attachment as well as execution upon a judgment, the FSIA permits the
waiver to be either express or implied.",
4 1
In 1981, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California in Security Pacific National Bank v. Government and
State oflran explained how prejudgment attachment operates under the
FSIA.42 The court observed that "this subsection provides, in cases (of)
... explicit waiver, a provisional remedy ... to prevent assets from
being dissipated or removed from the jurisdiction. ... ."4 "Thus," the
court explained, "for the plaintiffs to maintain valid attachments
pursuant to the FSIA, Iran must have explicitly waived its immunity
from such attachments." 44 The court noted that the FSIA "creates a
strong presumption against pre-judgment attachments" and concluded
that although Iran did waive its immunity from execution of judgment,
it did not explicitly waive its immunity from prejudgment attachment.45
The Security Pacific court's strict reading of the "explicit
waiver" requirement is the prevailing view. For example, in 1979, the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey stressed that
while "the explicit waiver required by section 1610(d) could be
satisfied by the provisions of the contract between the parties, or even
by their conduct during the course of their commercial dealings," the
'9 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d).
40ABA Report, supra note 31, at 584.
41 New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
42 See Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't & State of Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864
(C.D. Cal. 1981).
41 Id. at 879.
44id.
451 Id. at 880.
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46
exception remains a narrow one.46 Although the exception is narrow,
in Kensington International Limited v. Republic of the Congo, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
recitation of the precise words "prejudgment attachment" is not
necessary to waive immunity under the Act.47 Instead, the Kensington
court explained, "'a waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment
must be explicit in the common sense meaning of that word: "the
asserted waiver must demonstrate unambiguously the foreign state's
intention to waive its immunity from prejudgment attachment in this
country."'.. 48 In short, although the verbatim use of the words "pre-
judgment attachment" is not necessary to find an explicit waiver, the
exception is narrow and must be made unambiguously and
unequivocally.
Mr. Ramirez's statements highlight the policy reasons for
making prejudgment attachment of assets in FSIA cases particularly
difficult. Courts use prejudgment attachment of a defendant state's
resources to ensure the plaintiff's collection on a future judgment. In
FSIA cases, however, tensions arising from sovereignty and diplomatic
relations often accompany such an attachment. Such tensions likely
caused Mr. Ramirez to accuse Exxon of subjecting Venezuela to
"judicial terrorism." Venezuela took the position that the attachment
was an overreaching effort by the U.S. company to interfere with the
internal policy decisions of Venezuela and, therefore, its national
sovereignty. Prejudgment attachment is an extraordinary remedy, even
in purely domestic situations, because it deprives parties of the free use
of their assets before a final determination on the merits of a case is
even rendered.49 In FSIA cases, diplomatic tensions and potential
foreign policy consequences exacerbate these concerns. Thus,
prejudgment attachment requires an express waiver while an implied
waiver is sufficient for executing a judgment or attaching in aid of
execution.
46 Behring Int'l., Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 394
(D.N.J. 1979).
47 Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo, 461 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 261
(2d Cir. 2003)).
48 id.
49 See In re Megan-Racing Associates, Inc., 192 B.R. 321, 325 (N.D.N.Y.
1995).
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III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE FSIA
This part summarizes two articles' recommendations for
reforming the FSIA. Although both articles agree that Congress should
relax the Act to enable easier attachment of assets in aid of execution,
neither article addresses the important issues raised by prejudgment
attachment.
A. THE WORKING GROUP FOR THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
In 1998 the American Bar Association formed a working group
with the mission "to evaluate the operation and application of the
[FSIA] and consider whether any legislative improvements or
clarifications should be recommended., 50 The ABA created the group
because of the many unanswered questions raised by the statute, some
of which resulted in conflicting court opinions. Such questions
included the following: "[D]oes the definition of 'foreign state' apply
to second and third-tier subsidiaries . . . ? Can and should the
provisions on executing judgments be improved and strengthened?"
51
The working group published its finished product in 2002 and
proposed answers to both of these questions. It concluded that the
foreign state definition should apply to corporate subsidiaries, but that
those subsidiaries should presumptively be subject to the commercial
activity exception and therefore amenable to suit. The working group
also recommended that attached property need not relate to the
commercial dispute at issue, a change that would increase the ability of
a party to execute a judgment.
1. FOREIGN STATE SUBSIDIARIES
The group examined the corporate subsidiary question, or the
"tiering" issue, in Part III of its report. 52 A "tiered" entity is a
corporation not directly majority owned by a foreign state but rather
majority-owned by another corporation that is directly owned by a
foreign state. 53 The question of "whether such tiered ... entities fit
50 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 494.
5' Id. at 493.
2 Id. at 497.
53 Id. at 517.
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within the FSIA's definition of a corporation majority owned by a
foreign state and thus whether such entities enjoy the many protections
that the FSIA affords" had produced conflicting results among the
courts. 
54
A majority of courts, as of 2002, held that corporations
"indirectly owned by a foreign state through intermediary parent
corporations fall within the FSIA."55  Most of these courts did not
analyze the tiering issue but instead relied on the general language of
section 1603(a), which "defines the term 'foreign state' broadly to
include a political subdivision of a foreign state and an 'agency or
instrumentality' of a foreign state.",56 The section also "provides that
th[e] broad definition . . . applies to all sections in the FSIA except
section 1608." 57 These courts reasoned that "section 1603(b)(2), which
defines an 'agency or instrumentality' as entities majority owned by a
'foreign state,' includes entities majority owned by an 'agency or
instrumentality."' 58 Thus, "a corporation majority owned by another
corporation falls within the FSIA as long as an ultimate parent
corporation is itself majority owned by a foreign state." 59
A minority of courts reached the opposite conclusion and held
that corporations indirectly owned by a foreign state do not fall under
the FSIA.60 These courts relied on a different statutory construction of
54 Id.
55 Id. at 519 (citing, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 251 F.3d 795 (5th Cir.
2001); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d
932, 939-41 (7th Cir. 1996); Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 109
(6th Cir. 1995); Straub v. A.P. Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994);
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 449-50 (6th Cir.
1988); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta,
S.p.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (D.N.J. 1991), affd without opinion, 958
F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992)).
56 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 519 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 96
F.3d at 940).57 id.
58 id.
59 Id. (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 96 F.3d at 939).
60 Id. (citing Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1461-63 (9th Cir.
1995); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1285 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1993); Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 685-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., Nos. 95-3212, 95-3214, 1996 WL 502461, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 4, 1996); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No.
97 CIV. 6124(JGK), 1999 WL 307666, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1999);
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section 1603.61 The minority position "noted that section 1603(b)(2)
defines an 'agency or instrumentality' as an entity majority owned by a
'foreign state or a political subdivision thereof."' '62 Thus, "if the term
'foreign state' in section 1603(b)(2) means the same thing as in section
1603(a), that is, as including a 'political subdivision of a foreign state
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' then the phrase 'or a
political subdivision' in section 1603(b)(2) would be superfluous.,
63
Aside from statutory construction, the courts in the minority relied on
the legislative history of the FSIA to support their position.64 They
pointed out that "[i]n the House Report accompanying the FISA...
Congress explained that, to fall within section 1603(b)'s majority-
ownership provision, 'a majority of the entity's shares or other
ownership interest [must] be owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign
state's political subdivision)."' 65  Furthermore, the minority courts
pointed to practical considerations to justify their holdings. 66 These
courts were worried that a contrary holding would vastly expand the
immunity granted by the Act. One court explained this concern,
stating,
To add to the list entities that are owned by an agency
or instrumentality would expand the potential
immunity considerably because it would provide
potential immunity for every subsidiary in a
corporate chain, no matter how far down the line, so
long as the first corporation is an organ of the foreign
state or political subdivision or has a majority of its
shares owned by the foreign state or political
subdivision.67
This court concluded that it "would not 'assume that Congress
intended such a result."' 68 Finally, the minority also determined that
the need to treat a corporation as a sovereign entity lessens as the
Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 896 F.
Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
61 Id.
62 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 519-20 (citing Fed. Ins. Co., 12 F.3d at
1285 n.12).
63 Id. at 520.
64 Id. (citing Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462).
65 Id. (quoting Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583,
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2891)).
66 id.
67 Id. at 520-21 (quoting Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462).
68 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 521 (quoting Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462).
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corporations become more separated and removed from the
sovereign.69
The working group sided with the majority. It concluded that
"[t]o achieve consistency and promote the other purposes of the FSIA,
Congress should amend the Act to clarify that ... it does not require
direct majority ownership by a foreign state for an instrumentality to
qualify for presumptive immunity and the procedural protections of the
act. '7  The group's main reason for this recommendation was that
"some states utilize a tiered corporate structure to manage and control
important areas of national interest, such as natural resources."'" The
group recognized that "the strength of a foreign sovereign does not
necessarily dissipate when it employs more complicated legal
structures resembling those used by modem private businesses. 72
Recognizing the merit of the minority's concern about increasing the
scope of presumptive immunity, the working group also recommended
a presumption that such subsidiary companies are "engaged in a
commercial activity., 73 So, while the working group's
recommendation may at first appear to expand the immunity granted by
FSIA, it largely would not because "in the vast majority of cases a
lower tier corporation will be involved in a commercial activity.
74
Thus, according to the working group a "tiered" corporation should
qualify as a "foreign state" but also should usually be subject to the
"commercial activity" exception and therefore amenable to suit.
69 Id. (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
7°Id. at 517.
71 Id. at 523. The group provides Mexico as an example. Mexico, the sole
owner of the nation's petroleum, established a holding company in 1992 with
four operating subsidiaries. Id. Similarly, Venezuela has a number of
subsidiaries of PDVSA, the oil company wholly owned by the Government of
Venezuela, with which it controls the nation's petroleum interests. See
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion For an Order of
Attachment Without Notice, Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. PDVSA Cerro Negro
S.A., No. 07 Civ. 11590 (DAB), at 1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law].
72 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 523.
73 Id.
74 Id. The working group proposed one additional caveat: courts shall not
presume a foreign central bank that otherwise qualifies as an instrumentality is
engaged in commercial activity. Id.
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2. IMPROVING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
The working group's answer to the second question, whether the
provisions on executing judgments should be improved, is more
complex because the FSIA has three sections dealing with execution:
1609, 1610, and 1611. The working group pays section 1610 particular
attention in its report, noting that "in a statute of substantial complexity,
section 1610 is among the most confusing sections. 75 One reason for
the confusion is the distinction "between attachment in aid of execution
or execution in subsections (a) and (b) and pre-judgment attachments in
subsection (d). The grounds for obtaining a pre-judgment attachment
are even more limited than those for executing a judgment or attaching
in aid of execution. 76 The working group's main focus in the report is
making subsection 1610(a), which "creates various exceptions from
execution immunity for foreign states and instrumentalities," less
restrictive.
77
Subsection 1610(a) requires that the property to be attached for
purposes of execution be "used for a commercial activity in the United
States., 78  The working group disagreed with the language of
1610(a)(2), which demands that "execution in a commercial activity
case be limited to property related to the same commercial activity...
,79 The working group would solve this problem by making clear that
"there is no requirement of a nexus between the property being attached
or executed against and the underlying dispute."
B. THE "SOVEREIGNACTIVITY" APPROACH
One commentator, George K. Foster, recently published an
article outlining alternative proposals for reform of the FSIA.8 1 His
"sovereign activity" approach rejects a general rule of immunity with
an exception for commercial activity and advocates a general rule of
jurisdiction with an exception for sovereign activity:
7 Id. at 583.
Id. at 583-84.
77 1d. at 581.
78 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 584 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)).
71 Id. at 586. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
" Id. at 588.
81 Foster, supra note 16, at 723-30.
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The current focus on whether or not property is in use
for a commercial activity is not optimal. Rather than
having an exception that denies immunity to property
if it is in use for a commercial activity, there would
be advantages to having a general rule that makes
property of sovereigns available to its creditors,
subject to an exception that confers immunity on
property in use for a sovereign activity.
82
This shift would have important implications. Although the
FSIA currently allows the attachment of assets used in a commercial
activity in many cases, the "court still has to make some additional
finding, such as that the debtor State has made a waiver of immunity, or
that the property to be seized has a nexus to the underlying claim. '83 If,
however, "there were a general rule that automatically made property
of a sovereign available unless it was in use for a sovereign activity, no
such additional finding would be required '8 4 because the "property of a
82 Id. at 719-22. A "sovereign activity" is one in which only a sovereign
can engage. Id. at 720 n.251 (citing Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 614 (1992) ("[A] foreign government's issuance of regulations limiting
foreign currency exchange is a sovereign activity, because such authoritative
control of commerce cannot be exercised by a private party; whereas a contract
to buy army boots or even bullets is a 'commercial' activity, because private
companies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire goods.")); see also Tex.
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981)
("[I]f the activity is one in which a private person could engage, it is not
entitled to immunity.")). Examples of a "sovereign activity" and thus not a
"commercial activity" include:
a State's repayment of a loan to the IMF, a provincial
government's expropriation of a finance company's stake
in a local company, a State's expropriation of property of
Jewish refugees in the wake of World War II, a Ministry of
Agriculture's issuance of a license for the export of rhesus
monkeys to a U.S. company, and a State's imposition of
taxes on an airline.
Foster, supra note 16, at 675 (citations omitted, citing EM Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg.,
473 F.3d 463, 482 (2d Cir. 2007); Yang Rong v. Liaoning Provincial Gov't,
452 F.3d 883, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Garb v. Rep. of Pol., 440 F.3d 579, 586-87
(2d Cir. 2006); MOL, Inc. v. P.R. of Bangl., 736 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.
1984); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Rep. of Nicar., 96 Civ. 6360 (JFK), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7814, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000), affd, 228 F.3d 423 (2d Cir.
2000)).
83 Id. at 721 (citing FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(1)-(2) (2006)).
4Id. at 720.
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State would automatically be available if it is not in use for a sovereign
activity, whether or not a waiver has been made., 85 So, under Foster's
reforms, "the legal framework for enforcing awards and judgments
against sovereigns [would] be simplified... such.. . that property of a
sovereign would be automatically available to its creditors to satisfy
valid debts, unless the property is in use for a sovereign activity."
86
Thus, "[i]f a debtor state could not establish that a local asset was in use
for a sovereign activity ... it would be reachable."
87
Foster's sovereign activity approach is therefore more favorable
to those seeking to attach the assets of a foreign state than the ABA
Working Group's approach. In contrast, the ABA Working Group
would retain the current burdens of proof but would adjust how the
plaintiff may prove the defendant is excepted from immunity:
The [ABA] Report would leave in place threshold
commercial activity requirement, as well as the
waiver exception, but would eliminate all of the other
exceptions of the present § 1610(a) and replace them
with a broad exception denying immunity to property
of a foreign state where "[t]he judgment relates to a
claim for which the foreign state is not immune under
section 1605. .88
So, under the Working Group's recommendation, "once a
creditor has succeeded in obtaining jurisdiction against the sovereign,
and the creditor has obtained a judgment in its favor, it could reach any
property of the foreign State that was used for a commercial activity in
the United States, unless it was protected by § 161 l." 89 Although
Foster believes that the ABA reforms are a step in the right direction,
they do not "go far enough . . . because they retain [both] the
requirement that the property be 'in use for a commercial activity in the
85 Id. at 722.
86 Id. at 723. Foster's proposed scheme presumes sovereign property is
available to creditors. See id. at 730 ("Property in the United States of a
foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and execution only as
provided in §§ 1610 and 1611."). Id. (emphasis added).
87 Foster, supra note 16, at 725.
88 Id. at 726 (quoting ABA Report, supra note 31, at 587).
89 Id. (describing the ABA Report, supra note 31). 28 U.S.C. § 1611
contains a list of property that the statute deems immune from attachment in all
cases, including, for example, property connected with a military activity or the
property of a foreign central bank. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611.
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United States' . . . and the general rule of immunity set forth in §
1609."9°
Despite the liberalizing reforms proposed by both Foster and the
ABA Working Group, neither proposes any change to the FSIA's rule
regarding prejudgment attachment of assets. Indeed, the working group
states in its report that "no changes should be made in the pre-judgment
attachment provisions .... 91 Although Foster recommends that the
FSIA be relaxed even further, he too does not recommend any changes
to the explicit waiver requirement of section 1610(d).92 What reforms,
if any, should be made to subsection 1610(d), a subsection both Foster
and the ABA Working Group left undisturbed?
IV. THE VENEZUELA/EXXON LITIGATION AND SUGGESTED CHANGES
TO THE FSIA
Although largely ignored by the ABA Working Group and
Foster, prejudgment attachment under the FSIA deserves attention,
and Congress should reform the relevant provisions to better reflect
the Act's policy goals. Part IV discusses how this reform should take
place, using the Exxon/Venezuela litigation as background. First,
subpart IV(A) reviews Dole Foods Company v. Patrickson, in which
the Supreme Court held that corporate subsidiaries are not "foreign
states" under the FSIA.93 Second, subpart IV(B) explains how the
Supreme Court's holding in Dole was central to the District Court's
decision to award prejudgment attachment in the Exxon/Venezuela
case. Third, subpart IV(C) demonstrates why the Court's decision in
Dole was improper but why the District Court nevertheless reached
the correct result. Finally, subpart IV(C) concludes by recommending
how Congress should amend the FSIA to resolve the issues presented
by Dole and prejudgment attachment under the Act.
90 Foster, supra note 16, at 726.
91 ABA Report, supra note 3 1, at 588.
92 Foster's proposed changes to section 1610(d) are found in his proposed
section 1610(c). See Foster, supra note 16, at 730. Foster retains all the
language contained in the original FSIA section 1610(d) but adds his
"sovereign activity" requirement, which describes the type of assets that can be
attached. Importantly, he retains the explicit waiver requirement found in the
original statute as a necessary threshold element that must be satisfied before
any prejudgment attachment is allowed in this context. See id.
9' 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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A. BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT'S NARROW
DEFINITION OF INSTRUMENTALITY
The comments made by Venezuelan oil minister Raphael Ramirez
were in response to Exxon's legal actions resulting in the freezing of
billions of dollars in assets, including $300 million in cash located in
the United States.94 To understand why the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York allowed this attachment,
one must first understand Dole Food Company v. Patrickson, a case
decided by the United States Supreme Court in April 2003.95
In 1997, a group of farm workers hailing from Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama filed an action against Dole Food
Company in Hawaii state court. 96 In their complaint, the workers
alleged that Dole injured them through exposure to the chemical
pesticide dibromochloropropane.97  Dole Food Company then
impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., and Bromine Compounds, Ltd.
(the Dead Sea Companies), 98 which had been connected to the State of
Israel through corporate tiers at various times. 99 As illustrated by the
period of "1984-1985, Israel wholly owned a company called Israeli
Chemicals, Ltd.; which owned a majority of shares in another company
called Dead Sea Works, Ltd.; which owned a majority of shares in
Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; which owned a majority of shares in
Bromine Compounds, Ltd."'
100
The Dead Sea Companies moved for removal on the grounds that
they were "instrumentalities of a foreign state as defined by the FSIA,
entitling them to removal under § 1441(d)."'' The District Court
denied the motion.' 0 2 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed this ruling, holding that "a corporation owned by an
instrumentality of a foreign government is not itself an instrumentality
of that government."' 0 3 The United States Supreme Court then granted
94 See Witten, supra note 1.





'o' Dole, 538 U.S. at 472 (citing Civ. No. 97-01516HG (D. Haw. Sept. 9,
1998), App. to Pet. For Cert. in No. 01-594, p. 79).
102 id.
103 Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 2001)
(relying on Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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certiorari to answer, inter alia, the question "whether a corporate
subsidiary can claim instrumentality status where the foreign state does
not own a majority of its shares but does own a majority of the shares
of a corporate parent one or more tiers above the subsidiary."'0°
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit holding, stating
that "a foreign state itself must own a majority of the shares of a
corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the
state under the provisions of the FSIA .... .."" The Dead Sea
Companies were not directly owned by Israel during any time relevant
to the suit. 0 6 The Supreme Court decided that such companies did not
fall within the statutory language of section 1603(b)(2), which "grants
status as an instrumentality of a foreign state to an entity a 'majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof"'
107
The Supreme Court adopted a formalistic approach in construing
the statute. The Court noted that Congress adopted terms of art used in
corporate law and legislated in this context. 10 8 "The language of §
1603(b)(2) refers to ownership of 'shares,' showing that Congress
intended statutory coverage to turn on formal corporate ownership."'
0 9
Thus, the Court decided that the question turned on whether "Israel
owned shares in the Dead Sea Companies as a matter of corporate law,"
not whether Israel would be considered the "owner" of the companies
in some common-sense use of the term. 10 The Court then noted that,
under corporate law, "[a]n individual shareholder, by virtue of his
ownership of shares, does not own the corporation's assets and, as a
result, does not own the subsidiary corporations in which the
corporation holds an interest.""' Because Israel did not directly own
any shares of the Dead Sea Companies during any time relevant to the
case, the Dead Sea Companies did not qualify as instrumentalities of a
foreign state under section 1603(b)(2)."
'04 Dole, 538 U.S. at 471.
"' Id. at 480.
106 Id. at 473.
10 71d. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2000)).
'0' Id. at 474
109 Id.
ll0Dole, 538 U.S. at 474.
"' Id. at 475.
12Id. at 477.
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The Dead Sea Companies argued that the words "other
ownership interest" in subsection 1603(b)(2) should "include a state's
'interest' in its instrumentality's subsidiary."' 113 The Court disagreed
with this reading of the statute. The Court reasoned that this language
referred to an ownership interest similar to stock: "The statute had to be
written for the contingency of ownership forms in other countries...
that depart from the conventional corporate structures. ' 14 According
to the Court, "[r]eading the term to refer to a state's interest in entities
lower on the corporate ladder would make the specific reference to
'shares' redundant." 15 In other words, Congress used "shares" and
"other ownership interest" as referring to interests by direct ownership,
whether under the American corporate scheme or otherwise. It did not
list "shares" as one example of a catalogue of applicable ownership
interests that also included indirect interests in tiered entities. The
Dead Sea Companies also argued that even if they were not "owned"
by Israel, they should still qualify as instrumentalities under the statute
because Israel substantially controlled them.1 6 The Supreme Court
summarily rejected this argument, stating that "control and ownership.
. are distinct concepts," and one cannot be substituted for the other.
17
The Court relied on its strict, formalistic interpretation of the statute
and concluded that "[e]ven if Israel exerted the control the Dead Sea
Companies describe, that would not give Israel a 'majority of [the
companies'] shares or other ownership interest. ' 8 Thus, the Court
maintained its bright-line rule: "A corporation is an instrumentality of a
foreign state under the FSIA only if the foreign state itself owns a
majority of the corporation's shares."
119
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Conner, wrote a dissenting
opinion in which he disagreed with the Court's holding on this issue.
Justice Breyer concluded that "the statutory phrase 'other ownership
interest ... owned by a foreign state' . . . covers a Foreign Nation's
legal interest in a Corporate Subsidiary, where that interest consists of
the Foreign Nation's ownership of a Corporate Parent that owns the
shares of the Subsidiary."' 20 Justice Breyer rejected the formalistic and
narrow interpretation of the word "ownership" subscribed to by the
"1 Id. at 476.
"15 Id.




0 Id. at 480.
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majority. He noted that the Court had previously "held that
'shipowne[r]' can include a corporate shareholder even though,
technically speaking, the corporation, not the shareholder, owns the
ship." ' 2' Furthermore, the Court had also "held that a trademark can be
'owned by' a parent corporation even though, technically speaking, a
subsidiary corporation, not a parent, registered and thus owned the
mark."'122 Based on these prior holdings, Justice Breyer decided that
the majority's conclusion that "ownership" means only direct
ownership was ill-founded.
1 3
Justice Breyer also relied on a policy argument. The FSIA
provides numerous procedural protections desirable because of the
"potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states."'124  Justice
Breyer argued that no meaningful distinction, in light of these policy
goals, can be drawn between a state acting through a corporation it
owns directly and one that the state owns as a subsidiary:
Given these purposes, what might lead Congress to
grant protection to a Foreign Nation acting through a
Corporate Parent but deny the same protection to the
Foreign Nation acting through, for example, a wholly
owned Corporate Subsidiary? The answer to this
question is: In terms of the statute's purposes, nothing
at all would lead Congress to make such a
distinction. 125
Justice Breyer therefore contended that the need for the
procedural protections of the statute is "no less compelling" for
subsidiaries because "[t]he risk of adverse foreign policy consequences
is no less great."'
126
B. THE EXXON/VENEZUELA LITIGATION
The Supreme Court's holding in Dole was central to the trial
court's handling of the ExxonNenezuela litigation. On January 3,
121 Id. at 482 (quoting Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1929)
(emphasis added)).
122 Dole, 538 U.S. at 482 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 292 (1988) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added)).
123 Id. at 483.
124 Id. at 484 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976)).
125 Id. at 485.
126 Id. (citing the ABA Report, supra note 31, at 523).
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2008, Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., a corporate subsidiary of Exxon, filed
for an "ex parte Order of Attachment pursuant to Rule 64 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure" in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.' 27 Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. filed the
motion against PDVSA Cerro Negro S.A. (PDVSA CN), the company
with which it was engaged in a joint venture to extract oil from the
Orinoco region of Venezuela. 28 PDVSA CN was itself a third-tier
corporate subsidiary of Venezuela's state-owned oil company
PDVSA. 129  Following the Dole decision, the court concluded that
PDVSA CN did not qualify as an "instrumentality" of the state of
Venezuela and therefore did not fall under the FSIA. 3 ° Without any of
the procedural protections offered by the FSIA, the trial court needed
only to determine whether New York law would permit the
prejudgment attachment requested by the plaintiffs. 131 The District
Court was ultimately satisfied with the plaintiffs showing regarding
the need for attachment and ordered the attachment of $3 million.
C. REACTION TO THE EXXON CASE AND A PROPOSAL FOR
CHANGE
Should the decision in Dole and, consequently, the
Exxon/Venezuela litigation rest on the Court's "unnecessarily technical
reading" of the FSIA?132  If not, was the correct result reached
regardless of this mistake? What, if any, changes should Congress
make to the Act to correct the misapplication?
127 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law, supra note 71, at 1. The
"Introduction" of the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law also discusses the
background of the Exxon/Venezuela litigation arising from the expropriation of
assets in the Orinoco Region of Venezuela. Id.
1281d. at 1.
129 Id. at 1 n.2 ("Defendant PDVSA CN is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
PDVSA Petroleo, S.A., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PDVSA,
which itself is wholly-owned by the Government of Venezuela.... PDVSA
CN thus is a third tier, indirectly owned subsidiary of the Government of
Venezuela.").
130 Order of Attachment, Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. PDVSA Cerro Negro
S.A., CA No. 07 Civ. 11590 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2007).
3' Id. at 17 ("'At the commencement of and throughout an action, every
remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located,
provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential
judgment. But a federal statute governs to the extent it applies."') (quoting
FED. R. Cwy. P. 64(a)).
132 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 486 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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First, Justice Breyer was correct in his criticism of the Court's
overly formalistic understanding of "ownership" in the Dole decision.
The Court would have been better served to follow Justice Breyer's
reasoning and the suggestions of the ABA Working Group. Corporate
subsidiaries should indeed be treated as "instrumentalities" under the
statute. As the ABA Working Group acknowledged, some nations use
tiered corporate structures to manage and control resources with
important national interests. 3 3  The ABA Working Group Report
provides the examples of Mexico and Honduras. 134 Both countries use
corporate structures comprised of several layers to control natural
resources, such as oil and lumber.'
3 5
Venezuela employs a similar corporate structure for purposes of
managing its natural resources. Venezuela employs a "third-tier"
corporation, PDVSA CN, to manage and control one of its most
valuable natural resources, petroleum. 136 Certainly, "the strength of a
foreign state's sovereign interests in an area do not necessarily dissipate
when it employs more complicated legal structures resembling those
used by modem private businesses."' 137  Mr. Ramirez's vehement
comments, although likely attributable in part to nationalistic posturing,
add real-world credibility to this claim. Indeed, as Justice Breyer
elucidated, "decisions about how to incorporate, how to structure
corporate entities, or whether to act through a single corporate layer or
through several corporate layers are purely matters of form, not
substance."1
38
That is not to say that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York reached the wrong result. Indeed,
prejudgment attachment should have been available to the plaintiff and
should have been applied. The court, however, should have reached
this outcome via a more carefully planned route, one involving some
slight changes to the FSIA.
The first change requires the alteration of subsection 1603(b)
regarding jurisdiction over foreign nations and related entities
generally. Congress should amend this subsection to overrule the
Court's decision in Dole and to include in the definition of
133 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 523.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, supra note 71, at 1 n.2.
137 ABA Report, supra note 31, at 523.
13' Dole, 538 U.S. at 485.
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"instrumentality" a corporate subsidiary of an instrumentality of a
foreign state, such as PDVSA CN. This change would make the FSIA
more consistent with its purposes of maintaining international comity
and fairness as outlined by the convincing arguments presented by the
ABA Working Group and Justice Breyer in his Dole dissent. This
reform would reduce the frictions in a case like the Exxon/Venezuela
case by precluding a US court's absolute denial of immunity for a
corporate entity with which a foreign nation closely identifies.
Although Venezuela would be pleased with the proposed reform of
section 1603(b), the prejudgment attachment applied in the
Exxon/Venezuela litigation was nevertheless reasonable.
While prejudgment attachment was the most fair and reasonable
outcome of the issue, the court nevertheless could not have reached it
under the Act had it identified the subsidiary as an instrumentality of
Venezuela. The failure would have occurred because the subsidiary
would have shouldered its burden to show the immunity defense; the
plaintiffs would have shouldered the burden to show the commercial
activity exception applied; but the plaintiffs would have no recourse
under § 1610(d) for prejudgment attachment because Venezuela issued
no unequivocal waiver. To remedy this insufficiency, Congress should
also reform subsection 1610(d) and remove the explicit waiver
requirement. 39 This reform is consistent with the purposes of Mr.
Foster's suggestions but goes further in liberalizing the availability of
prejudgment attachment. Similar to Mr. Foster's suggestions, without
the waiver requirement present in section 1610(d), any assets of the
defendant "foreign state" in the United States used for a commercial
activity would be subject to attachment. 40 Thus, applied to the Exxon
case, the District Court would reach the same result: 4 the court would
consider PDVSA CN an instrumentality and therefore within the scope
of the FSIA, and the reformed subsection 1610(d) would not require
any waiver, explicit or otherwise, in order to attach the assets of the
company.
1'9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(1).
140 Foster recommends discarding the general rule of immunity from
attachment. Instead, he recommends that in order for assets to be immune, the
defendant state must show that assets are in the U.S. in connection with a
"sovereign activity." Foster, supra note 16, at 724-27. This change is not
necessary. Assets in the U.S. used for a "commercial activity" should be
reachable. Foster merely argues that the burden should be on the defendant
state; however, the current regime that places the burden on the plaintiff to
show the assets' status is satisfactory.
141 The same result would be reached assuming that Exxon could show
that assets were used for a "commercial activity."
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These two reforms more properly reflect modem expectations
and business realities. While corporations like PDVSA CN should be
considered foreign states or instrumentalities under 1603(a)(2), they
should not be given special protections that shield them from potential
judgments. When sovereign nations contract with private parties in a
business relationship, they should do so on relatively equal terms. Put
simply, when a nation acts as a business, it should be treated as a
business. "By descending to the level of a commercial actor, a foreign
government divests itself of its sovereign status. In other words, when
a foreign sovereign engages in commercial activity, that foreign
sovereign is no longer acting in a sovereign capacity.
1 42
Although Congress should discard the waiver requirement of
subsection 1610(d), it should incorporate into the FSIA a slightly
stricter standard for the application of prejudgment attachment. As the
FSIA operates now, in addition to the explicit waiver requirement, "it is
generally necessary to satisfy whatever prerequisites for pre-judgment
attachment exist under the law of the relevant jurisdiction. 1 43 That is
to say, once a trial court determines that a defendant has made an
explicit waiver, it applies the law of the situs state regarding
prejudgment attachment. 144 State law, therefore, applies even in FSIA
cases in federal court. 45 Laws regarding prejudgment attachment vary
from state to state. Generally, however, "the party seeking the
attachment must establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its
claims, and must show that the debtor has or is likely to remove,
encumber or conceal assets in order to frustrate collection."'
46
142 Clinton L. Narver, Putting the "Sovereign" Back in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or
Instrumentality Status, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 197 (2001).
143 Foster, supra note 16, at 712 (citing FED. R. Civ P. 64(a)).
144 See FED. R. CIV P. 64.
145 Foster, supra note 16, at 712.
146 Id. (citing, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. 6201(3)). Indeed, New York law
regarding prejudgment attachment was applied in the Exxon Case because the
action was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. The plaintiff, Mobil CN, in its Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for an Order of Attachment Without Notice, stated:
Mobil CN must show that: (1) there is a cause of action; (2)
it is probable that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits;
(3) the amount demanded form the defendant exceeds all
counterclaims known to the plaintiff, and (4) 'the award to
which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered
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Congress could simply increase this burden and require the party
seeking attachment to display a strong likelihood of success on the
merits and a strong likelihood that the defendant state will remove
assets to frustrate collection.
A meaningfully stricter standard incorporated into the FSIA
would achieve two important goals. First, demanding a stronger
showing by the plaintiff accounts for the larger and more consequential
scale in FSIA cases, At first blush, a sovereign acting as a business
should not receive special treatment. However, cases involving foreign
nations present special challenges and can have substantial
international consequences. Demanding a stronger showing by the
plaintiff takes proper notice of the sensitivities involved in FSIA cases;
that is, it -incorporates the notions of sovereignty and respect owed to
foreign states and their instrumentalities. Second, incorporating a
stricter prejudgment attachment standard into the FSIA would help
achieve uniform decision making in cases involving foreign states. As
Justice Breyer recognized in his Dole dissent, lawmakers designed the
FSIA, in part, to channel cases involving foreign states into federal
court.147  Funneling these cases into federal courts was meant to
develop a uniform body of law in this area. 148 Uniformity "is desirable
since a disparate treatment of cases involving foreign governments may
have adverse foreign relations consequences., 149 Incorporating the
standard for prejudgment attachment into the statute would further the
goal of creating a uniform body of law in cases involving foreign
sovereigns because each court would apply the same standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Congress should expand the definitional section of the
FSIA to include corporate subsidiaries, such as PDVSA CN, as
instrumentalities of a foreign state, it should also limit the protections
for states and their instrumentalities. While more entities should fall
under the Act, they should not receive the same liberal protections -
particularly regarding prejudgment attachment. These changes would
accomplish two important goals while more accurately reflecting
current expectations. First, the changes pay proper deference to the
ineffectual without such provisional relief.' CPLR §
6212(a); CPLR § 7502(c).
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law, supra note 71, at 18.
141 Dole, 538 U.S. at 484 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32).
148 Id.149 ld. at 485.
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sovereignty of foreign state defendants by requiring a more robust
showing by the plaintiff when it requests prejudgment attachment.
Second, incorporating an express, stricter standard for prejudgment
attachment would help accomplish uniformity in decision making in
FSIA cases. Increasingly, foreign states contract with private parties in
business relationships. When a state acts like a business, it should be
treated as one. Thus, a state acting as a business should not be afforded
such strict procedural advantages that shield its assets from attachment.
These two changes are constructive steps in recognizing these
principles.
Ultimately, however, negotiated contracts will largely govern
litigation between private actors and foreign states.15 0 The removal of
the waiver requirement, in effect, alters only one default contractual
term. That is, a private party need not bargain for an explicit waiver in
order for a U.S. court to apply prejudgment attachment in FSIA cases.
A foreign state, however, may still include a contractual term
forbidding prejudgment attachment altogether or forbidding
prejudgment attachment absent a future explicit waiver. Nevertheless,
removing the explicit waiver requirement is not a futile measure. By
removing the explicit waiver requirement, a foreign state and a private
actor are placed on more equal ground at the bargaining stage when
forming a contract. Indeed, the parties should be on relatively equal
ground when engaging in a business relationship because the foreign
state is not acting in its sovereign capacity. t5 Therefore, Mr. Ramirez
may still curse Exxon and accuse it of "judicial terrorism," but if these
proposed reforms are enacted, he would have less cause to do so.
150 Foster, supra note 16, at 716.
151 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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